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BANK COMPETITION AND STABILITY IN PORTUGAL 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation studies the impact of bank competition on their stability. It does so by 
analysing the Portuguese banking sector in the period between 2006 and 2018. We used 
several measures of competition to assess this relationship (Boone, HHI and Lerner), and, 
our results indicate that competition has a positive effect on bank’s stability. Therefore, 
our results support the competition-stability hypothesis. In addition, using a unique 
measure of competition to address this issue is not enough to take assertive conclusions 
on the role of competition on bank stability in Portugal. Hence, this study accounts for 
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BANK COMPETITION AND STABILITY IN PORTUGAL 
 
Resumo 
O presente trabalho final de mestrado estudo o impacto da competição entre bancos na 
sua estabilidade. Fá-lo através da análise do sistema bancário português entre 2006 e 2008 
Usamos várias medidas de competição para avaliar esta relação (Boone, HHI e Lerner), 
os nossos resultados indicam que a competição tem um efeito positivo na estabilidade de 
um banco, como tal suportam a hipótese de competição-estabilidade. O estudo confirma 
que utilizar uma única medida de competição para estudar este tópico não é suficiente 
para tirar conclusões assertivas sobre o papel da competição na estabilidade de um banco 
em Portugal. O estudo inclui análises de robustez tendo em conta o período de crise, o 
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Financial stability is defined by the European Central Bank (2019) as a condition in 
which the financial system is capable of withstanding shocks and the unravelling of 
financial imbalances. Although the financial system comprises several financial 
intermediaries, in Portugal, banks continue to be the most important player in the market, 
therefore it is very important to study the functioning of banking system as a central factor 
of financial stability. One of the main drivers of the global financial crisis of 2008 was 
the high level of risk existing in banks’ balance sheets. Because of this financial crisis, 
Portuguese financial system faced a particular difficult situation imposing the need to 
enforce rules to ensure its stability. One relevant question in this debate and that has 
implications in regulator’s policy is whether competition among banks affect positively 
or negatively their stability. 
More competition in a market means that the supply curve moves to the right so it 
may have an effect reducing the price, in this case, the interest rate. Van Leuvensteijn et 
al. (2011) stress out that competition may affect the way changes in the policy rates of 
the European Central Bank (ECB) are passed on to the interest rates that banks offer their 
customers.  
About this topic, we have two strings of theory, “Competition-Fragility” and 
“Competition-Stability”. The competition fragility view states that increasing 
competition decreases the degree of market power consequently reduces bank’s profit 
margins and franchise values Carletti and Hartmann (2002). Thus, to increase their returns 
banks are encouraged to take on more risks, deteriorating the quality of their loan 
portfolios. Franchise value reflects intangible capital that banks will only realise if they 
do not go bankrupt, the larger the value, the more unwilling banks become to increase 
risk de-Ramon et al. (2018). The competition-stability view emphasizes the idea that a 
higher level of competition in credit markets lead to a fall in loan rates, thus borrowing 
firms’ probability of default declines, which improves banks’ profitability and helps build 
capital buffers thus raising bank stability overall Boyd and De Nicoló (2005). 
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 Existing empirical evidence is mixed, since we have several studies that support both 
theories. When considering studies that analysed a single country banking system, we can 
point Jiménez et al. (2010), Kasman and Kasman (2015) and Marsh and Sengupta (2017) 
to support “Competition-Fragility”, for Spain, Turkey and USA, respectively. Supporting 
“Competition-Stability” we have Schaeck and Cihák (2008), Liu et al. (2012), Clark et 
al. (2018), all of them cross-countries studies. As pointed out by Beck (2008) this theory 
is more supported by cross-country studies. 
Prices and costs of banking products are not available thus, we do not have direct 
measures of competition and must construct indirect measures. The construction of the 
several measures of competition affect the results that are obtained and consequently the 
results of the implication of competition on stability. This question was addressed using 
3 different measures of competition, Boone indicator, Lerner index and Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), first and second measuring competition and the latter 
concentration. Stability was proxied by different measures typically used to access 
individual risk, as Z-Score and its components and Non-Performing Loans.  
The aim of this dissertation is to continue the debate, as in all articles existing suggest 
that further research is needed to investigate in more detail the nature of this relationship. 
I wanted to provide an insightful perspective of the Portuguese case. Although Portugal 
was part of the sample of some studies, as in Beck et al. (2006) along with 68 other 
countries or in Bikker and Haaf (2002) with 22 to the best of my knowledge, it is the first 
that clearly studies this relationship solely for Portugal. Moody’s Bank Focus is the only 
database that includes the information needed for this study, but by adding information 
of 8 years to the existing (2013-2017) I was able to perform a much richer analysis. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the theoretical 
background about the “Competition-Fragility” and “Competition-Stability” views as well 
as results of research that supports each theory. Chapter 3 presents the methodology 
applied to perform this analysis, including the baseline model and all variables that were 
used. Data definition, sources and descriptive statistics are presented in Chapter 4. In 
Chapter 5, Empirical Analysis, we have 2 different sections, baseline model and several 
robustness tests results. Finally, in chapter 6 we have the main findings summarized as 
well as recommendations for future research on this topic.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Whether more competition improves or worsens bank stability is an important issue 
that continues to spark debate in academic, policymaking and regulatory circles. The 
existing literature about this relationship can be divided in 2 categories, the “Competition-
Fragility” and “Competition-Stability” views. This section gives a brief description of 
each hypothesis. 
 
2.1 “Competition-Fragility” view 
 
The first main hypothesis, the “Competition-Fragility” view posits that a higher 
level of competition reduces the market power that each bank has, thus it puts more 
pressure on profits and leads them to take excessive risks. This results in higher fragility 
of the banking system. With an influential study Keeley (1990) shows that the 
liberalization of laws governing branching, multibank holding company expansion, and 
interstate entry in the 1980’s increased competition in the American banking industry. 
Associated with higher competition is a decrease in the bank’s charter value (monopoly 
rent). The author concluded that banks with lower market power, proxied by a lower 
market-to-book asset ratio, hold less capital relative to assets and have higher default risk 
(reflected on higher risk premiums on large and uninsured certificates of deposits). Beck 
(2008) reinforces that, according to this view the deregulation that occurred in the U.S as 
well in many emerging markets in 1970’s and 1980’s, would lead to more fragility. 
Besanko and Tackor (1993) focus on the relationship between the bank and its 
customers and the acquisition by the bank of private borrower-specific information that 
generates informational rents. Banks have incentives to limit their exposure to risk as long 
as they take advantage of this relationship by absorbing part of the informational rent. 
Greater competition has a direct effect on asymmetric information between the two 
parties eroding the informational value of such relationship. Smaller informational 
advantage in dealing repeatedly with the same borrowers constitute an incentive to hold 
a portfolio with greater level of risk, especially when deposits are backed by a risk 
insensitive insurance scheme. 
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The link between competition in the deposit market and risk-taking incentives, in 
the presence of limited liability and a social cost of failure is explored in Matutes and 
Vives (2000). The authors reached several conclusions, first when deposit insurance does 
not exist, competition is intense, and the social cost of failure is high banks tend to set 
excessive deposit rates, therefore bank asset risk is high; The second result happens when 
deposits are insured through a flat rate scheme, this situation makes banks more 
aggressive competitors. Excessive competition leads to high deposit rates (even without 
failure costs), maximal asset risk position undertaken by banks and to an excess supply 
of deposits. In this case, deposit (rate) regulation and direct asset restrictions will be 
examples of policies that can eliminate the negative effects of excessive competition. 
Finally, when it is introduced a deposit premium that is risk-based, it decreases incentives 
to take risk on the deposit side making deposit rates lower than in the first situation. These 
results stress the importance that regulation can have in the level of risk of a given 
portfolio and its effects on welfare.  
In a dynamic model Hellmann et al. (2000) describe in a straightforward way how 
competition undermines prudent bank behaviour. An increase in competition is a result 
of financial market liberalization, consequently profits suffer a reduction, which implies 
lower franchise values, described as capitalized value of expected future profits. If 
expected future profits are going to be lower banks have fewer incentives for making 
good loans. Banks can invest either in a prudent or in a gambling asset, if markets are 
competitive bank earns little with the prudent investment, nonetheless it can always 
capture a rent from gambling. Hence, increased competition promotes gambling in the 
banking sector. 
Along the years several empirical studies were conducted and found evidence that 
support this theory, Yeyati and Micco (2007) with all commercial banks in 8 Latin 
American countries; Turk Ariss (2010) examined data from 821 banks across 60 
developing countries over the period from 1999 to 2005; Jiménez et al. (2010) reached 
similar results analyzing the Spanish banking sector from 1988-2003; Kasman and 
Kasman (2015) used information on 28 Turkish commercial banks from 2002 to 2012; 
Marsh and Sengupta (2017) tested with U.S. banking data from 1990 to 2005; Leroy and 
Lucotte (2017) reached the conclusion with a sample of 97 listed banks in Europe 
covering the period 2004-2013.  
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2.2 “Competition-Stability” view 
 
A recent trend of both theoretical and empirical models emerged in support of 
“Competition-Stability” view and refute the traditional one. These models advocate that 
the intensification of competition in credit markets will cause a fall in loan rates therefore 
the probability of default of borrowing companies falls as well. This, in turn will improve 
bank’s profits and helps building capital buffers that helps raising bank stability de-
Ramon et al. (2018).  
Mishkin (1999) suggests that banks that operate in a market with few participants 
usually get public guarantees and other “to-big-to-fail” subsidies, it is an indication that 
policymakers are more concerned with bank failures when there is low competition. The 
existence of a government safety net that protects depositors is in the origin of a moral 
hazard problem. Depositors that are protected do not have incentives to monitor the bank 
and withdraw their savings if the bank is taking too much risk, therefore banks have 
incentives to take a higher level of risk that the one they would take if the protection did 
not exist. 
Caminal and Matutes (2002) constructed a model in which borrowers face a moral 
hazard problem and consequently banks choose between costly monitoring and credit 
rationing. The aforementioned authors show that for intermediate monitoring costs only 
a monopoly bank will incur in those costs and does not have the need to credit ration loan 
applicants. As a result, this bank is willing to originate risky loan portfolios. The lower 
the competition is the bigger are the incentives to solve agency problems that translate 
into more incentives to take aggregate risk. 
The typical argument that higher market power has a positive effect on bank’s profits 
and therefore can increase its stability misses an important fact, the impact that this market 
power has on firm’s behaviour (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005). Bank has no direct control 
over the riskiness of borrower’s projects, instead it is the entrepreneur who choose the 
risk of their investment projects that are being financed with bank loans. Boyd and De 
Nicoló (2005) claim that less competition will have two effects, on the one hand it results 
in lower deposit rates, which allows banks to increase their profits and intentionally seek 
less risky future investments; on the other hand, it means higher loan rates, it impacts 
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negatively borrower’s profits making them seek for more risk. They show that the loan 
market effect dominates the deposit market effect, meaning that increasing competition 
results in lower bank risk. 
There are quite a few examples in the empirical literature that found a positive 
relationship between competition and stability. Covering the period of 1995-2005 with a 
dataset that include banks from 10 European countries plus US banks Schaeck and Cihák 
(2008) suggest that competition enhances bank soundness. In addition, Liu et al. (2012) 
with a sample of banks that operate in South East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Vietnam) between 1998 and 2008; Clark et al. (2018) uses data for the commercial 
banks of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for the period between 2005 and 
2013; de-Ramon et al. (2018) focused on banks operating in UK spanning the period 1989 
to 2013 obtained similar results. 
Apparently, the two streams of the literature predict opposing results regarding the 
impact of competition on stability, however Berger et al. (2009) introduce the idea that 
this is not necessarily true. The reasoning is the following, higher market power in loan 
market may be an encouragement for riskier loan portfolios, but it does not imply an 
increase of the overall risks of the bank. If because of higher market power, the bank’s 
franchise value increases, they will try to protect it with risk mitigating techniques such 
as increase in equity capital, reduction of interest rate risk, sales of loans or credit 
derivatives or a smaller loan portfolio. Using data from 8,235 banks in 23 developed 
nations their empirical results suggest that banks with a higher degree of market power 
also have less overall risk exposure, consistent with “Competition-Fragility” view, but it 
also increases loan portfolio risk, giving some support some support to the “Competition-
Stability” view. Taking into account that higher loan rates increases bank’s revenues from 
performing loans Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) show that a U-shaped relationship 
between competition and fragility is obtained. The same non-linear relationship was 
found by Tabak et al. (2012) when testing for 10 Latin American countries. 
Overall, the existing theoretical models obtain ambiguous results regarding the 
relationship between the degree of competition and stability in the banking sector. 
According to Beck (2008) empirical analysis that use data of a single country give the 
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ambiguous results as well, while cross-country studies point more to a positive 
relationship between them. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to perform our analysis on the relationship between bank stability and 
competition in Portugal the following regression was estimated: 
 
(1) 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑡+𝑒𝑖,𝑡.             
    
where 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is a measure of stability, the subscript i refers to a bank, and the subscript 
t to the year. The variables that will be used as proxies for stability are: Non-Performing 
Loans ratio, Z-Score, Return on Assets, Equity-to-Assets, Standard Deviation of Return 
on Assets, Risk-adjusted Return on Assets and Risk-adjusted Capital Ratio. The main 
dependent variables are the NPL ratio and the Z-Score, but because the different 
components of Z-Score embody different aspects of a bank´s stability, it is useful to study 
the effects of competition on each one of the aspects; this is easily done by putting each 
of these variables as dependent on the regression.  
For 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 3 proxies will be used namely Boone indicator, Lerner index 
and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for assets. HHI and Lerner index are both 
measures of market power. HHI is a common measure used in studies about concentration 
in a given sector, so it will be useful to do comparisons to conclusions reached in the same 
studies, HHI will be calculated for Portuguese assets of deposit takers. Lerner index is 
able to measure the mark-up that a firm is able to charge over its marginal cost. Boone 
indicator measures competition from an efficiency perspective, calculated as the elasticity 
of market share to marginal costs. Behind this measure is the idea that banks that are more 
efficient achieve higher market shares or profits, therefore the more negative the indicator 
is, higher degree of competition exists.  
Other factors that also affect bank stability must be considered, according to the 
existence literature Fu et al. (2014), Lee et al. (2014), Kasman and Kasnam (2015) the 
following bank-level controls are used: bank size (log of total assets), provisions to assets 
ratio (%), total loans to assets ratio (%), wholesale (non-retail deposits) to total deposits 
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ratio (%) and non-interest revenue to total revenue (%). Vectors of bank-level controls 
are represented by 𝑋𝑖,𝑡. 
𝑌𝑡 is the variable that accounts for macroeconomic controls that will be used, 
namely Portuguese rate of inflation, unemployment and real GDP growth. The last 
variable will also be accounted for the Euro Area.  𝑌𝑡  also includes financial controls 
such as short and long interest rate for the Euro Area and average of ratings of Portuguese 
banks. These controls are important because the used timespan includes periods of 
turmoil in banking sector. 
This model or simple variations of it has already been used by several authors to 
study the same relationship for a single country setting or in cross-county analysis. 
Examples research articles that use it are de-Ramon et al. (2018) for the English market 
and Brei et al. (2018) using 33 Sub-Saharan countries. 
 
3.1 Dependent Variables 
As mentioned in the previous section I am going to use several indicators as 
dependent variables to proxy for stability: Non-Performing Loans ratio, Z-Score, Return 
on Assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡), Equity-to-assets (𝑘𝑖,𝑡), Standard Deviation of Return on Assets 
(𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝐴), Risk-adjusted Return on Assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡/𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝐴), and Risk-adjusted Capital 
Ratio (𝑘𝑖,𝑡/𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝐴). 
The first main dependent, the NPL ratio, is used in this study as a measure of bank 
credit risk-taking behaviour. Kasman & Kasman (2015) argue that credit risk is the main 
source of banking risk, explaining its importance as a dependent variable. Banks that have 
high levels of NPL ratio face balance sheet, profitability and capital constraints, leading 
to a negative impact on their lending ability ECB (2017). Banking failures may arise due 
to uncontrolled high levels of NPL.  
Z-Score is a widely used measure for bank stability in the related literature such 
as Boyd and Runkle (1993) and De Nicoló et al. (2003). The indicator is computed in the 
following way: 
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It is a measure that combines indicators of profitability, leverage, and return 
volatility. I used a 3-year rolling window to calculate ROA’s standard deviation for two 
reasons, one is to allow for time variation in the denominator and the other is because 
banks do not divulge the information needed at a more granular level. This variable will 
give the number of standard deviations a bank’s return on assets has to decline to deplete 
its equity. The higher (lower) the Z-index is the lower (higher) is the default probability 
of banks, meaning that this indicator is inversely related to the probability of insolvency. 
Bank stability is a complex concept therefore it is not possible to assess it using a 
single measure therefore stability is also going to be checked with risk adjusted measures 
of return. Higher values of risk-adjusted return on assets and risk-adjusted capital ratio 
indicate higher bank stability.   
 
3.2 Independent Variables 
Two measures of banking market competition (Boone indicator and Lerner index) and 
one measure of concentration (HHI) are used in this study.  
3.2.1 Boone Indicator 
As a starting point in assessing competition among banks, I used Boone indicator. 
The main idea is that in a more competitive environment firms are punished for being 
inefficient Boone (2008). This concept applies to all industries, so banking is no 
exception. At the expense of the inefficient banks, banks that are more efficient will 
increase their market share and profits Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2018). The Boone indicator 
in is the simplest form is presented by many authors as: 
 
(3) 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡 ln(𝑐𝑖,𝑡) + Θ𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where π represents the variable profits of bank i at time t, variable costs are the difference 
between revenue (sum of interest revenue and fees and commissions received) and 
variable costs (labour costs, administrative costs and interest paid on deposits) scaled by 
total assets. The β indicates the Boone indicator, which is estimated for each period t. 
Average variable costs are represented by 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, obtained dividing variable costs by variable 
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revenue. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents a group of control variables, which include provisions, loans to 
assets, proportion of retail funding (proportion of client deposits on total deposits) and 
balance sheet size. 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. de-Ramon et al. (2018) uses the group of control 
variables, a similar approach is used by Khan et al. (2016) without taking into 
consideration any control variable.  
Following some researchers that transformed the formula of Boone Indicator by 
replacing the value of bank profit with a bank market share and instead of average 
marginal costs, we obtain:  
(4) ln 𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡 ln(𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + Θ𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where 𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the market share, measured in terms of loans, of the i-th bank at time t. 
The formula behind MC (Marginal Cost) is explained in section 3.2.2. 
Larger market share is expected to be attained by banks with lower marginal costs. 
A high absolute value of β means that there is a high level of competition in the market, 
so we have a reallocation of market share from less efficient banks to more efficient.  
The Boone indicator is suitable for this study because, according to Van 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) authors of the first study applying the Boone indicator to 
banking markets, it requires relatively small data, allows estimation using data with 
annual frequency and has a strong technical basis.   
 
3.2.2 Lerner Index 
This study employs the conventional approach of Lerner index, a non-structural 
indicator to measure the degree of competition. It is widely used in bank research 
(Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005), Berger et al. (2009), Soedarmono et al. (2013), Tan 
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It is the difference between price (P) and marginal costs (MC) expressed as a 
percentage of price hence it captures the capacity of price power of each bank under 
analysis. This index will range from less than 0 to 1, where 0 means perfect competition, 
1 the existence of a pure monopoly and values lower than zero imply a non-optimal state 
because the marginal cost is higher than the price that is being charged. The higher the 
index is, the higher is the ability to charge over the marginal cost. 
The price of total assets 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is proxied by the ratio of interest and non-interest 
revenue to total assets for bank i at time t. We can calculate price in this way under the 
assumption that the flow of services produced by banks is proportional to the totality of 
its assets as pointed out by Turk Ariss (2010). More difficult to calculate is the marginal 
cost 𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 since it is not directly observed for any bank. To obtain MC first the following 
translog cost function is going to be estimated: 
 














𝑘=1 ∑ 𝛿𝑗 ln(𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡)
3




2 + 𝜃1𝑇 + 𝜃2𝑇
2 + ∑ 𝜆𝑗 𝑇 ln(𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡)
3
𝑗=1 + 𝑖,𝑡. 
 
where c is bank’s total costs, including financial and operational costs. Output (Q) is 
proxied by total assets. Wj,it represents three input prices, namely, the prices of labor, 
capital and funding. Prices of production factors are defined as W1,it – ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets, I used personnel expenses instead of the number of employees 
because of availability of data on Bankfocus; W2,it – ratio of operating costs such as 
buildings and administrative costs to total assets; W3,it – ratio of interest expenses (interest 
paid on deposits) to total deposits. Ei,t denotes equity capital. To account for technical 
change T (Trend) is included. For banks that do not accept deposits from clients and 
therefore do not have interest expenses, such as Credibom, marginal cost was obtained 
without considering W3.  
Marginal cost was computed as the derivative of total cost with respect to output, 
as shown in equation 6: 
 













This index is not a perfect measure since it does not capture risk premia in the 
prices of banks’ product and services Berget et al. (2009) but it is the only measure of 
competition that is possible to use at an individual level.  
 
3.2.3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares, represented by 𝑠𝑖, of 
all companies of a given sector. We observe the maximum value, 1, when there is a single 
company controlling the entire supply of a given sector. The other extreme value, the 
minimum is obtained when we have n companies with equal market shares, therefore their 
market share is 1/n the same value of HHI.   
 
(7) 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑠2𝑁𝑖=1 . 
 
European Union made a classification of the levels of concentration in a given 
industry, for this institution if HHI is lower than 0.1 the industry is unconcentrated, 
between 0.1 and 0.2 is moderately concentrated and highly concentrated when we are in 
the presence of an index higher than 0.2 European Union (2004).  
In banking industry, we can calculate the index with shares considering total assets, 
total deposits or loans, it is a relatively easy variable to obtain. Other variable that it is 
commonly used in the literature as in Bikker & Haaf (2002), Beck et al. (2006) or Zhang 
et al. (2013) is the Concentration Ratio. It only takes into account a certain number of the 
largest banks in a country, I don’t think this is a good measure for the Portuguese market 
because we have a considerable number of small banks and banks that have origin after 
2006, the first year considered in this study, which will not be considered in this index. 
HHI includes these two features making it a widely used measure. 
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3.3 Control Variables 
 
When we are studying the effect of competition on bank stability it is important to 
control for factors that might affect market structures, financial stability or both Uhde & 
Heimeshoff (2009). To account for the business cycle conditions annual growth rate of 
GDP is included, both Portuguese and European rate. On the one hand, banks’ investment 
opportunities may be correlated with business cycles Laeven and Majoni (2003), on the 
other hand, bank’s asset quality is improved due to the increase of borrowers’ solvency. 
Interest rates are also important and have impact on bank’s asset quality. The other 
macroeconomic controls are unemployment and inflation rate, because the timespan 
includes a period of noteworthy financial turmoil in banking sector. 
Unlike other articles about this subject besides macroeconomic controls, I included 
financial controls by incorporating bank’s ratings. Ratings used are provided from 
Moody’s, which typically assigns two ratings to a bank, bank deposit ratings and bank 
financial strength ratings. A bank that is rated has superior intrinsic financial strength, 
strong financial fundamentals and predictable and stable operating environment Moody’s 
(2018). We transformed the qualitative rating scale into a quantitative rating scale. The 
scale used by Moody’s varies between C (default) and Aaa (highest quality), each grade 
was transformed into a linear scale, where C corresponds to zero and 1 to Aaa as depicted 
in Table 1. From 2016 onwards Moody’s gives rating to only 5 Portuguese banks, Banco 
BPI, Banco Comercial Português, Banco Santander Totta, Caixa Geral de Depósitos and 
Novo Banco. We calculated the arithmetic average of ratings attributed to these banks to 




























































































Table I  
Linear Transformation of Moody’s Rating  





Bank of Portugal defined the relevant banking market of this study taking into account 
the authorized institutions. By choosing only banks, I am not considering the so-called 
Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks or Savings Banks, the reason for not including the first 
one is that it is composed by 86 local level institutions, each one with a financial report. 
These institutions cannot perform the exact same services that banks can, so for a correct 
comparison all individuals are banks. Panel dataset includes annual information for 29 
banks. All the variables that were used and their sources are described in Table 2. 
Information regarding the period 2013-2017 was retrieved from Moody's Analytics 
BankFocus. These are the years available for Portuguese banks in the database. To have 
more observations the remaining information, meaning 2006-2012 and 2018 I collected 
from the annual reports from each individual bank. This study spans the period 2006-
2018, which covers the period of Portuguese financial crisis (2010-2014). Although it 
would be beneficial to have a larger spanning period, it is not possible to retrieve prior 
information neither from individual nor from Bank of Portugal’s website. 
The panel is unbalanced because we do not have the same periods available for each 
cross-sectional unit. This happened due to three reasons, one is because some banks of 
our sample were created after 2006 meaning that they only have observations for a smaller 
period. The other reason is that one bank, namely Banco Efisa, S.A, did not release its 
2018 annual report until July of 2019, like the other banks. The third and last reason is 
related to a specific variable, Tier 1 Capital. Some banks opt to inform on their Tier 1 
Capital ratio, which is calculated by dividing the bank’s tier 1 capital by its total risk-
weighted assets (RWA). In the case that information on the value of RWA is not given it 
is not possible to know the value of Tier 1 Capital. Keeping in mind the reasons behind 
the unbalanced panel data we can conclude that in this case attrition is not based on factors 
that are related to the response variables. 
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Variable Definition Source 
Measures of stability: 
  Z-score 
    Return on assets 
    Equity to assets ratio 
    Standard deviation of return on assets 
    Risk-adjusted return on assets 
    Risk-adjusted equity to assets ratio 
  NPL ratio 
 
Measures of competition: 
  Boone Indicator 
  HHI (assets) 
  Lerner Index 
 
Bank level controls:  
  Bank Size  
  Provisions to assets ratio (%)  
  Total loans to assets ratio (%)  
  Wholesale to total deposits ratio (%)  
  Non-interest to total revenue (%)  
 
Macroeconomic and financial controls: 
  PT GDP growth 
  EA GDP growth  
  PT Inflation rate 
  PT Unemployment rate 
  EU Short run interest rate 
  EU Long run interest rate 
  PT banks ratings 
 
(Return on assets+ equity to assets)/standard deviation of ROA 
After tax net income / total assets 
Total equity / total assets 
Standard deviation of ROA using 3 year rolling window 
Return in assets/ standard deviation of ROA 
Equity to assets/ standard deviation of ROA 
Non-performing loans/ total loans 
 
 
Elasticity of market share to marginal costs  




Log of total assets 
Loan loss reserve/ total assets 
Loans/ total assets 
Customer deposits / total deposits 
Fees and commissions revenue/ total revenue 
 
 
Annual rate of real GDP growth 
Annual rate of real GDP growth  
Annual rate of inflation 
Unemployment rate 
Annual short run interest rate 
Annual long run interest rate 
Average banks ratings of BCA in a numerical scale 
 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
 
 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
 
 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 
Bank Focus, author’s calculations 










Table II  
Variables definition and source 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for each variable of interest. The analysis 
consists of 289 bank-year observations for 29 Portuguese banks over the 11-year sample. 
Initially existed 347 observations of which the observations of 2006 and 2007 for all 
variables were loss due to the use of a 3-year rolling window in the calculation of standard 
deviation. The calculation of Lerner Index is lacking one observation because Montepio 
Investimento Bank did not provide its labour costs for the year of 2018.  
The average NPL ratio is 6.344% with a large degree of dispersion across banks, 
ranging from -4906.27% to above 2776.9%. The minimum value is negative because one 
bank had negative values for loans in two consecutive years, in absolute value it was small 
compared to the value of NPL.  
The mean values of competition measures provide an image of the structure of 
Portuguese banking market. Boone Indicator has on average a small absolute value (0.14), 
it means that according to this variable Portuguese banking market has a low level of 
competition. The HHI for assets has an average of 0.207, the value is higher than 0.2, so 
according to the values defined by the European Union the market is highly concentrated. 
Lerner Index average is positive, 0.245 since it is closer to 0 than to 1, and this market 
leans towards perfect competition. Banco Haitong obtains the minimum value of Lerner 
Index, 15.182 in 2013, meaning that the price charged was lower that the marginal cost. 
If we had considered the two first years for all banks, the average of the Lerner Index 
would have been -0.557. The former measure indicates that on average we are in the 
presence of a competitive market while the latter points out that we have low levels of 
competition. Different results provided by the indicators stress that is difficult to arrive at 
a consistent interpretation of the competition in this specific market. 
The timespan used in this study includes a period of financial crisis that affected 
Portugal in a more severe way than it affected the Euro Area, on average the two grew 
0.234 and 0.829, respectively.  Unemployment rate fluctuated between 2006 and 2018, 
the highest value (16.18%) was registered in 2013 while the lowest (7%) in the last year 
of analysis.  





Figure 1 shows how Boone Indicator evolved over the sample period, we can 
observe that it follows a downward path. An increase in the indicator, as seen in 2010 and 
2016, implies worsening of the competitive conduct of financial intermediaries. 
According to FRED between 2006 and 2015 the average of the Boone Indicator for the 
Euro Area was -0.025 whereas for the same period for Portugal it was -0.14. We can 
conclude that in this period Portugal had a higher degree of competition when compared 
to the Euro Area.    
The evolution on HHI for assets is displayed in Figure 2, during the first six years 
of analysis it was relatively constant at around 0.23. From 2011 onwards, it has a 
downward trajectory reaching its lowest level in 2018. Typically, banking systems in 
smaller euro area countries tend to be more concentrated and Portugal is included in this 
group. By looking at the results presented in the Report on Financial Structures of 2017 
Portugal was in line with the trajectory of Euro Area, the peak of the group was achieved 
Table III  
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Variables  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Z-score 289 30.986 53.863 -8.584 459.605 
    ROA 289 .321 7.753 -29.56 100 
    K 289 15.061 20.09 -42.78 100 
    Standard deviation of ROA 289 2.31 7.347 .023 57.963 
    Risk adjusted ROA 289 1.291 3.374 -9.005 20.788 
    Risk adjusted K 289 29.694 52.248 -7.073 458.043 
 NPL 289 6.344 345.07 -4906.27 2776.9 
 Boone 289 -.14 .278 -.736 .32 
 HHI 289 .207 .029 .17 .242 
 Lerner 288 .245 1.262 -15.182 .982 
 Bank Size 289 14.302 1.892 10.616 18.542 
 Provisions to Assets 289 4.832 10.618 0 99.654 
 Loans to Assets 289 45.589 40.927 -.59 522.16 
 Wholesale to total deposits 289 48.621 38.406 0 158.852 
 Non interest to total revenue 289 22.813 20.348 0 95.574 
 GDP_PT 289 .234 2.208 -4.03 2.8 
 GDP_EA 289 .829 1.895 -4.5 2.4 
 Inflation 289 1.172 1.28 -.84 3.65 
 Unemployment 289 11.41 2.918 7 16.18 
 IR_Short_EU 289 .665 1.3 -.33 4.63 
 IR_Long_EU 289 2.604 1.289 .93 4.36 
 Ratings_PT 289 .43 .178 .23 .73 
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in 2014 while in Portugal it was in 2011. HHI for loans and deposits have a similar path 





















Source: Bank Focus and author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 2 
HHI for total assets, deposits and loans 2008-2018 
Figure 1 
Boone Indicator 2008-2018 













Table 4 presents the mean values of the main variables of competition and stability 
of this study and their evolution in time. In the columns of Boone and HHI are the 
indicators itself and not mean values. The trend for the NPL is ascending between 2010 
and 2013, suffering a high decrease in the following year. NPL ratio is still at a high level 
but its evolution shows banks’ efforts to reduce it. The other variable that we have to 
measure stability, Z-score, also has an ascending trajectory with a lag of one year, so it 
begins in 2011 and ends in 2014. The highest value of this measure is obtained in 2018.      
The correlation coefficients between the parameters of this study are displayed in 
Table 4. As shown in this table the correlation between the independent variables is lower 
than 0.90, suggesting the absence of the problem of multicollinearity, we only have one 
exception that is the correlation between Z-Score and Risk-adjusted Equity to Assets 
ratio. It is interesting to note that our first main independent, Z-Score, appears to be 
negatively correlated to all competition indicators. When considering NPL, this variable 
is negatively correlated to Boone and Lerner index and positively correlated to HHI. Once 
again, we cannot directly conclude on the relationship between stability and competition 
due to the different conclusions obtained with the correlation matrix. 
  
 
Table IV  
Means of Competition and Stability measures, by year 
 
Year Z-score NPL Lerner Boone HHI 
      
2008 27.355     2.181   .504 -.017   .233 
2009 40.852   4.018 -.400 -.061   .235 
2010 19.340     3.708 .209 .320    .242 
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5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Baseline Results 
 
In the following three tables, we report the empirical results of estimation equation 1, 
using the Fixed Effects Model using Z-Score, ROA, Equity to assets ratio, Standard 
deviation of return on assets, Risk-adjusted return on assets, Risk-adjusted equity to assets 
ratio and NPL ratio as the dependent variables. Fixed Effects Model was chosen instead 
of Random Effects after doing the Hausman test in which we rejected the null hypothesis. 
We estimate three estimates for each dependent variable, one for each measure of 
competition, Boone, HHI and Lerner index. In these first regressions, both control and 
macroeconomic control variables are present, and uses all banks in the sample in the 
timespan 2008-2018.  
The results show that the coefficients of Boone Indicator (Table 5) are negative and 
significant at a 5% (or lower) for three variables Z-Score, Equity to assets and Risk 
adjusted Equity to Assets, indicating a positive relationship between competition and 
stability. For these variables are consistent with Competition-Stability hypothesis. In the 
case of NPL, the relationship is positive but is not a consistent result. Comparing the 3 
variables of competition Boone indicator is the variable with more significant results in 
the Portuguese case. 
In HHI (Table 6) results none of the variables considered were significant at 10% 
level. When compared to the result obtained in the first regression, the sign of the 
relationship between stability and competition is different in the case of Standard 
Deviation of Return on Assets, which now suggest that lower competition has a positive 
effect on bank’s stability. 
In the Table 7 are depicted estimation results using Lerner index as a measure of bank 
competition. The finding indicates that the impact of this indicator on Z-Score, Equity to 
Assets ratio, Risk-adjusted Equity to Assets ratio and NPL ratio, is negative, although it 
is only significant for Z-Score and Risk-adjusted Equity to Assets ratio. It is only 
significantly positive for Risk-adjusted Return on Assets.  
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Decomposing Z-Score in its components gives us insights on which components are 
responsible for the positive impact of the three measures of competition on this measure 
of stability. It means that when exists a lower level of competition, banks are less probable 
to deplete their equity and therefore the lower the probability of default. On one hand in 
all regressions the coefficients of ROA were positive, it indicates that competition affects 
negatively profitability. The higher the competition is the less banks are efficient in using 
their assets to generate earnings. On the other hand, we have the opposite effect on Equity 
to Assets ratio (K). This is a measure of solvency, and the signal indicates banks are 
encouraged to hold more capital when have a lower market power. The result of asset 
return volatility is not conclusive. The coefficients of this variable in Boone and Lerner 
indicate that higher competition reduce volatility, while the coefficient in HHI suggests 
otherwise. It is easier to explain the latter, if we are in a competitive market in order to 
gain market share a bank increases asset risk to increase its returns. The two additional 
variables created, Risk-adjusted Return on Assets and Risk-adjusted Equity to Assets 
ratio have negative and significant coefficients being aligned with the Competition-
Stability theory. Overall, higher competition makes banks to reduce asset portfolio risk 
and have a lower risk-adjusted capitalization ratio.    
In all the regressions (with exclusion of the regression when using Risk-adjusted 
return on assets) the coefficient of Bank Size (ln_assets) is negative and in some cases 
significant related to bank stability measures indicating that big banks are less stable than 
small banks. The same happens to Provisions to Assets, this time the exception is the 
regression using Equity to Assets ratio, meaning that banks that have a small loan loss 
reserve when compared to their total assets also tend to riskier. A negative relationship 
was also found in Non-Interest Revenue, so banks that bet more on non-traditional bank 
activities are less stable. 
Additionally, when analysing the effects of macroeconomic variables, we have mixed 
signals. For example, Inflation rate has a positive effect on NPL, so when the economic 
uncertainty caused by a higher rate of inflation causes Non Performing Loans to increase, 
this may happen due to a higher volume of non-performing loans or a rationing of credit 
by banks or a combination of both. Despite having some mixed signals some variables go 
in the direction expected, as unemployment grow and interest rates increase fragility 
increases. 
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Although in our regressions we did not have very significant results in the cases that 
they are we have more cases with a negative relationship between competition and 
stability variables, negative values suggest less competition in the market. In general, our 
results suggest that higher banking competition results in bank stability. The first 
conclusion is that the Portuguese case goes against the empirical results in other studies 






Table V  
Regressions of alternative stability measures on Boone Indicator  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl 
        
Boone -48.65*** 4.483* -9.135** 1.658 -1.600* -47.05*** 34.88 
 (16.39) (2.574) (4.159) (2.031) (0.956) (16.00) (122.0) 
Bank Size -2.787 -0.807 -15.51*** -2.725*** 0.324 -3.110 -86.72* 
 (6.933) (1.089) (1.760) (0.859) (0.404) (6.767) (51.62) 
Provs_Assets -0.0535 -0.338*** 0.812*** -0.345*** -0.0158 -0.0377 -1.786 
 (0.580) (0.0910) (0.147) (0.0719) (0.0338) (0.566) (4.317) 
Loans_Assets -0.112 0.0125 -0.0157 0.0126 0.00806 -0.120 0.291 
 (0.100) (0.0157) (0.0254) (0.0124) (0.00584) (0.0977) (0.745) 
Wholesale -0.106 -0.00137 0.0139 0.00497 -0.0240** -0.0821 1.989 
 (0.165) (0.0260) (0.0420) (0.0205) (0.00964) (0.161) (1.231) 
Prop_revenue -0.511* -0.0800* -0.102 0.0420 -0.0298* -0.481 -1.434 
 (0.308) (0.0484) (0.0781) (0.0382) (0.0180) (0.301) (2.293) 
GDP_PT -3.382 0.0471 0.206 0.306 0.0876 -3.469 152.6** 
 (10.04) (1.577) (2.548) (1.245) (0.586) (9.800) (74.75) 
GDP_EA 4.829 -0.0437 0.401 -0.662 -0.160 4.989 -189.9** 
 (11.42) (1.793) (2.897) (1.415) (0.666) (11.14) (85.00) 
Unemployment -4.590 -0.231 -0.478 -0.0588 -0.218 -4.371 33.32 
 (3.088) (0.485) (0.784) (0.383) (0.180) (3.014) (22.99) 
Inflation -5.855 0.167 0.0844 1.225 0.0141 -5.869 182.3** 
 (10.51) (1.651) (2.668) (1.303) (0.613) (10.26) (78.27) 
IR_Short_EU -9.382** -0.390 -1.880* -0.541 -0.152 -9.229** -30.61 
 (4.290) (0.674) (1.089) (0.532) (0.250) (4.187) (31.94) 
IR_Long_EU 5.066 -0.922 -0.183 -0.930 -0.219 5.286 0.113 
 (5.357) (0.841) (1.359) (0.664) (0.312) (5.228) (39.88) 
Ratings_PT 28.05 -1.540 8.576 -2.375 0.245 27.81 -283.1 
 (39.00) (6.124) (9.896) (4.833) (2.274) (38.06) (290.3) 
Constant 123.2 21.24 237.1*** 44.92*** 1.146 122.1 852.6 
 (110.0) (17.27) (27.91) (13.63) (6.412) (107.3) (818.7) 
        
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 
R-squared 0.154 0.087 0.469 0.159 0.145 0.149 0.040 
Number of id 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 











Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl 
        
HHI -785.5 72.70 -62.42 -9.226 -45.77 -739.7 9,105* 
 (705.2) (109.7) (178.0) (86.22) (40.64) (688.2) (5,140) 
ln_assets -2.737 -0.812 -15.52*** -2.722*** 0.328 -3.065 -87.97* 
 (7.039) (1.095) (1.776) (0.861) (0.406) (6.869) (51.31) 
Provs_Assets -0.119 -0.332*** 0.803*** -0.344*** -0.0186 -0.101 -1.491 
 (0.589) (0.0916) (0.149) (0.0720) (0.0339) (0.575) (4.291) 
Loans_Assets -0.113 0.0126 -0.0160 0.0127 0.00805 -0.121 0.279 
 (0.102) (0.0158) (0.0256) (0.0124) (0.00585) (0.0992) (0.741) 
Wholesale -0.105 -0.00150 0.0139 0.00503 -0.0239** -0.0808 1.962 
 (0.168) (0.0261) (0.0424) (0.0205) (0.00967) (0.164) (1.224) 
Prop_revenue -0.486 -0.0823* -0.0979 0.0414 -0.0288 -0.457 -1.528 
 (0.313) (0.0486) (0.0789) (0.0382) (0.0180) (0.305) (2.278) 
GDP_PT 5.085 -0.737 0.651 0.501 0.634 4.451 31.56 
 (13.91) (2.163) (3.510) (1.700) (0.801) (13.57) (101.4) 
GDP_EA -8.302 1.171 -0.926 -0.696 -0.859 -7.443 -66.24 
 (14.92) (2.320) (3.765) (1.824) (0.860) (14.56) (108.7) 
Unemployment -3.369 -0.346 -0.719 0.0988 -0.0678 -3.301 -14.83 
 (4.890) (0.760) (1.234) (0.598) (0.282) (4.772) (35.65) 
Inflation 7.182 -1.037 1.580 1.184 0.666 6.516 77.32 
 (13.19) (2.052) (3.329) (1.613) (0.760) (12.88) (96.17) 
IR_Short_EU -11.19** -0.222 -1.839 -0.641 -0.301 -10.89** 9.027 
 (5.352) (0.832) (1.351) (0.654) (0.308) (5.223) (39.01) 
IR_Long_EU 14.10 -1.760 -0.270 -0.484 0.495 13.60 -185.4 
 (15.54) (2.416) (3.922) (1.900) (0.895) (15.17) (113.3) 
Ratings_PTb 8.510 0.252 2.351 -0.627 0.201 8.309 -525.7* 
 (42.40) (6.594) (10.70) (5.184) (2.443) (41.38) (309.1) 
Constant 257.5** 8.840 256.2*** 42.94*** 6.998 250.5** 141.4 
 (119.7) (18.62) (30.21) (14.64) (6.898) (116.8) (872.6) 
        
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 
R-squared 0.128 0.078 0.459 0.156 0.139 0.123 0.052 
Number of id 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
 
Table VI  
Regressions of alternative stability measures on HHI  







After doing the regressions with full model I run the regressions firstly without 
macroeconomic variables then without bank control variables to see if the results remain 
the same without these variables. In general, the results remained more or less the same, 
in terms of significance and signal. In appendix Table A2 we have the results on HHI 
when we did not take into account Y variables because when compared to the results 
obtained in estimation of equation 1 was the case that presented more changes. Regarding 
signal, it occurred a change, in the ROA, that now has a negative sign, being completely 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl 
        
Lerner -5.292* 0.160 -0.840 0.156 0.292* -5.584** -5.389 
 (2.751) (0.430) (0.692) (0.337) (0.159) (2.681) (20.25) 
ln_assets -2.869 -0.857 -15.18*** -2.822*** 0.277 -3.146 -81.93 
 (7.050) (1.102) (1.773) (0.864) (0.406) (6.871) (51.90) 
Provs_Assets -0.246 -0.331*** 0.788*** -0.341*** -0.00997 -0.237 -1.806 
 (0.591) (0.0925) (0.149) (0.0725) (0.0341) (0.576) (4.353) 
Loans_Assets -0.0859 0.0118 -0.0110 0.0117 0.00633 -0.0922 0.331 
 (0.102) (0.0160) (0.0257) (0.0125) (0.00590) (0.0998) (0.754) 
Wholesale -0.129 -0.00183 0.0180 0.00347 -0.0238** -0.106 2.072* 
 (0.168) (0.0263) (0.0423) (0.0206) (0.00969) (0.164) (1.238) 
Prop_revenue -0.521* -0.0805 -0.105 0.0427 -0.0275 -0.493 -1.503 
 (0.312) (0.0488) (0.0784) (0.0382) (0.0180) (0.304) (2.296) 
GDP_PT -7.042 0.226 -0.0420 0.312 0.0528 -7.094 157.8** 
 (10.18) (1.592) (2.561) (1.248) (0.587) (9.924) (74.97) 
GDP_EA 3.931 0.210 -0.221 -0.510 -0.289 4.219 -191.8** 
 (11.57) (1.809) (2.908) (1.418) (0.666) (11.27) (85.15) 
Unemployment -8.357*** 0.0477 -0.986 0.0159 -0.309* -8.047*** 37.35* 
 (2.969) (0.464) (0.746) (0.364) (0.171) (2.893) (21.85) 
Inflation -3.055 -0.230 0.967 1.035 0.192 -3.247 182.0** 
 (10.57) (1.653) (2.659) (1.296) (0.609) (10.30) (77.84) 
IR_Short_EU -7.591* -0.562 -1.474 -0.622 -0.110 -7.481* -30.78 
 (4.304) (0.673) (1.082) (0.528) (0.248) (4.195) (31.69) 
IR_Long_EU -2.644 -0.240 -1.553 -0.689 -0.457* -2.187 6.101 
 (4.795) (0.750) (1.206) (0.588) (0.276) (4.673) (35.30) 
Ratings_PTb -12.62 2.426 0.459 -0.862 -1.256 -11.36 -255.2 
 (36.64) (5.729) (9.213) (4.491) (2.111) (35.71) (269.7) 
Constant 211.5* 14.99 245.5*** 44.16*** 4.154 207.3* 703.5 
 (109.2) (17.07) (27.45) (13.38) (6.290) (106.4) (803.6) 
        
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
R-squared 0.137 0.077 0.456 0.161 0.149 0.134 0.041 
Number of id 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
 
Table VII  
Regressions of alternative stability measures on Lerner Index 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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align with the other components and Z-Score itself. The coefficient of this variable is in 
this case significant at 10% level (or lower) for 6 out of 7 measures of stability. In the 
original results, it was only significant for NPL, but when we take out of the estimation 
macroeconomic controls the opposite verifies.  
Due to lack of space to present all the results from the regressions done, the authors 
will be completely available to present them if necessary. 
 
5.2 Robustness Tests 
 
5.2.1 Crisis period 
 
To confirm if Competition-Stability still applies when only considering the period of 
crisis, we divided the sample in crisis period, including observations of 2008 to 2010, 
being P1 and a post crisis period, with observations from 2011 onwards, being P2.   
Table 8 reports the results of the signs of the coefficients of each measure of stability 
on each measure of competition, constructed from tables A3, A4 and A5. Firstly, we can 
point that for some variables it is determinant if we are in a crisis or in a post period, take 
for example Equity to Assets Ratio and Risk-adjusted return on assets. In the estimation 
of equation 1 the coefficients on Boone, Lerner and HHI were negative, when considering 
post crisis sample the same applies. The difference is in the signal of the coefficient in 
HHI and Lerner index in the crisis period, it is positive and significant. We can observe a 
different behaviour of this variable, in the crisis period the results are consistent with 
Competition-Fragility theory, a negative relationship between competition and stability. 
In a crisis and with more competition a bank holds a lower volume of capital. In the case 
of Risk-adjusted return on assets the results, we also observe changes concerning Boone 
and Lerner in crisis period vis-à-vis post crisis. In the case of Risk-adjusted Equity to 
Assets, we can observe that do not exist differences when taking into account two 
different periods in the timespan, the results continue to support the Competition-Stability 
theory.  
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We can conclude that if we took the period of crisis of our sample, as many other 
authors have done, we would have reached the same results when compared to baseline 
model. The same do not apply when we only take into account this period of turmoil. 
Both Boone and Lerner have more results that are in support of Competition-Stability, 
but once more, we do not achieve many significant results. We have to refer that the size 







5.2.2 Size, Capitalization and Liquidity 
 
Important banks characteristics such as Size, Capitalization and Liquidity may have 
an impact on how competition affect their stability therefore we divided the sample into 
two subsamples, for each of the referred bank characteristic. Size is proxied by total 
assets, we considered that a bank is larger when its total assets are equal or greater than 
1 000 million euros. Capitalization is given by Equity to assets ratio and Liquidity by 
Loans to Assets. A bank is categorized as high capitalization and high liquidity if it has 
values above the median of each variable. 
In the first regressions, the coefficient of Banks Size on each measure of competition 
was negative with exception of Risk-adjusted Return on Assets. When assessing the 
results of estimation with the division between small and big banks we can see some 
 
 Z-Score ROA K Sd3_ROA Risk ROA Risk K NPL 
Variables P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 
               
Boone + − −* + − − −*** + + −* − − − +* 
HHI − − +*** + +*** − +*** + − −* − − +** +* 
Lerner − − −** − + −* − − − + − − − − 
               
Table VIII  
Signs and significance of coefficient in crisis and post crisis period 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
CATARINA DIAS     BANK COMPETITION AND STABILITY IN PORTUGAL  
28 
 
differences comparing to the original sample. In the case of ROA for big banks, we have 
the opposite sign (positive) with significance in Boone indicator. For a bank with higher 
volume of assets, a higher degree of competition leads to fragility. The coefficients of Z-
Score and Risk-adjusted Return on Assets remain negative and were the ones that were 
significant therefore, once more it supports Competition-Stability.  
Regarding capitalization, the results remain in general the same. For this variable it is 
important to stress out that during our timespan were imposed by Basel III that Minimum 
Tier 1 capital rises from 4% to 6%, not only banks must increase their level of capital but 
also its quality so if this study is replicated the mean of K should be higher.   
When comparting the results of banks with low liquidity to high ones we have two 
possible results. First, the coefficients of Z-Score, ROA, Risk-adjusted Return on Assets 
and Risk-adjusted Equity to Assets ratio have the same signals as in the original 
regression, no existing difference between low and high liquidity. Secondly, for Equity 
to Assets ratio, Standard Deviation of Return on Assets and NPL ratio the coefficient has 
opposite signs for each type of bank. For K and NPL ratio banks with low liquidity have 
negative coefficient, but in contrary to other measures a high NPL is not desirable, we 









 Size Capitalization Liquidity 
 Small  Big  Low  High  Low  High  
Variables (1) (7) (1) (7) (1) (7) (1) (7) (1) (7) (1) (7) 

















































































             
 
Table IX  
Regression accounting for size, capitalization and liquidity 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






In the last few years the Portuguese Banking System has been going through a 
restructuring phase due to the role that excessive risk existing in bank’s balance sheets 
had in the global financial crisis of 2008. The Basel III agreement has the aim of 
improving regulation, supervision and risk management of banking systems. The key 
principles are applied to all countries that signed the agreement but one important point 
to take into consideration is that each system is affected differently by regulations. The 
conclusions retrieved from this study can be helpful for regulatory entities to understand 
in a more insightful way how the Portuguese system works and how they should regulate 
competition in this sector. 
 The main contribution of this study is to perform a test on the relationship between 
competition and stability for the Portuguese Banking System. The approach taken to 
examine this relationship was to perform regressions with Z-Score (and its components) 
and NPL as dependent variables and as proxies of competition we had 3 different 
measures of competition, the Boone indicator, the Lerner index and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI). Besides the dependent and independent variables referred we 
also controlled for macroeconomic conditions and banks characteristics. Our panel 
dataset includes annual information for 29 banks for the period of 2006 to 2018. 
 From the baseline model the main conclusion is that the Competition-Stability theory 
suits the Portuguese case, and we obtained more significant results when using Boone 
Indicator than when other measures were used. Next, we considered the model without 
control variables, major differences occurred in HHI when we did not accounted for 
macroeconomic variables resulting in more significant results, but also consistent with 
Competition-Stability. Finally, 4 robustness tests were performed, considering the period 
of crisis, bank size, capitalization and liquidity. When the period of crisis is not considered 
in the sample, we would reach the same results when compared to baseline model. For 
Size and Capitalization results remained more or less the same. When considering banks 
with high and low liquidity for several measures (Equity to Assets ratio, Standard 
Deviation of Return on Assets and NPL ratio) the impact that competition has depends 
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on the volume of liquidity. Overall, our conclusions support the Competition-Stability 
view. As competition arise in this market, resulting a higher number of players, 
willingness to take risk decreases and consequently improvement of overall bank 
stability.  
The main difficulty in studying the relationship between competition and stability in 
Portugal was lack of information existing to do so. Contrary to other Central Banks, the 
Bank of Portugal only has a database with indicators for the banking system as a whole, 
instead of having information for each bank. Moody’s database has the information 
needed but for a very limited number of years (2013-2017). The added value of this study 
is the construction of the database behind it, and the information of 8 of the 13 years 
presented was retrieved manually from each individual report. In sum, we did a richer 
analysis than the studies previously done in which Portugal was a part of the sample.    
Further research can consider Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks and Savings Banks 
increasing the sample size. More important than the size of the sample is the timespan 
used, it could be beneficial to use information regarding more years, but that would only 
be possible if all banks provide their reports prior to 2006 or Bank of Portugal provides 
such information. It would also be interesting to test this relationship using other models 
(random effects, pooled OLS, first differences) to check whether the conclusions remain 
the same or not. To access competition an interesting path is to use different measures 
such as Panzar-Rosse approach or Bresnahan-Lau method as they embody different 
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  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   (18)   (19)   (20)   (21)   (22) 
 (1)  1.000 
 (2)  0.025 1.000 
 (3)  0.308 -0.019 1.000 
 (4)  -0.143 0.363 -0.031 1.000 
 (5)  0.503 0.203 -0.070 -0.108 1.000 
 (6)  0.998 0.012 0.322 -0.140 0.454 1.000 
 (7)  0.006 -0.069 0.012 0.016 -0.035 0.009 1.000 
 (8)  -0.164 -0.003 -0.208 -0.066 -0.089 -0.163 0.025 1.000 
 (9)  -0.281 0.078 -0.154 -0.022 -0.184 -0.278 -0.014 0.629 1.000 
 (10) -0.026 0.109 -0.132 -0.006 0.231 -0.041 -0.034 0.101 0.087 1.000 
 (11)  0.045 0.146 -0.215 -0.032 0.044 0.043 -0.016 0.012 -0.022 0.139 1.000 
 (12)  -0.119 -0.187 0.182 0.208 -0.182 -0.111 0.043 -0.104 0.001 -0.135 -0.255 1.000 
 (13)  -0.063 0.071 -0.125 0.059 0.056 -0.068 0.008 0.175 0.139 0.174 0.246 0.135 1.000 
 (14)  0.075 -0.036 0.137 0.001 -0.142 0.087 0.058 -0.213 -0.169 -0.075 0.173 -0.079 -0.172 1.000 
 (15)  0.003 -0.058 -0.036 0.066 -0.027 0.005 0.012 -0.206 -0.136 -0.037 -0.192 -0.146 -0.277 0.333 1.000 
 (16)  0.109 0.042 0.133 0.049 0.076 0.108 -0.013 -0.709 -0.352 -0.046 0.005 0.048 -0.057 0.168 0.187 1.000 
 (17)  0.003 0.036 0.111 0.070 -0.027 0.005 -0.016 -0.526 -0.167 -0.048 -0.009 0.055 -0.045 0.106 0.133 0.780 1.000 
 (18)  -0.068 -0.015 -0.063 0.040 -0.047 -0.067 0.032 0.364 0.090 0.051 0.023 -0.061 0.055 -0.060 -0.075 -0.234 0.281 1.000 
 (19)  -0.226 -0.005 -0.032 -0.022 -0.205 -0.219 -0.009 0.295 0.499 -0.056 -0.056 0.080 0.007 -0.135 -0.102 -0.494 -0.122 0.002 1.000 
 (20)  -0.077 -0.026 -0.163 -0.072 0.013 -0.080 -0.013 0.617 0.206 0.116 0.028 -0.115 0.117 -0.099 -0.183 -0.315 -0.281 0.417 -0.251 1.000 
 (21)  -0.123 -0.015 -0.211 -0.076 -0.052 -0.123 -0.008 0.950 0.507 0.114 0.017 -0.124 0.166 -0.197 -0.210 -0.656 -0.515 0.370 0.124 0.746 1.000 
 (22)  -0.033 -0.009 -0.153 -0.029 0.030 -0.036 0.015 0.706 0.266 0.119 0.042 -0.126 0.141 -0.122 -0.152 -0.571 -0.502 0.483 -0.167 0.682 0.697 1.000 
 
(1) Z-score, (2) ROA, (3) Equity to assets ratio, (4) Standard deviation of ROA, (5) Risk-adjusted ROA, (6) Risk-adjusted Equity to assets ratio, (7) NPL, (8) HHI, (9) Boone Indicator, (10) Lerner Index, (11) Bank Size, (12) Provisions 
to assets ratio, (13) Total loans to assets ratio, (14) Wholesale to total deposits ratio, (15) Non-interest to total revenue, (16) PT GDP growth, (17) EA GDP growth, (18) PT Inflation rate, (19) PT Unemployment rate, (20) EU Short 
run interest rate, (21)  EU Long run interest rate, (22) PT banks ratings 



















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl 
        
HHI -401.5*** -33.29* -106.3*** -29.14* -26.68*** -374.8*** 808.7 
 (125.4) (18.83) (30.96) (14.88) (7.195) (122.1) (891.3) 
ln_assets 0.846 -0.671 -14.70*** -2.539*** 0.504 0.342 -71.14 
 (7.135) (1.072) (1.762) (0.847) (0.410) (6.948) (50.73) 
Provs_Assets -0.453 -0.310*** 0.766*** -0.321*** -0.0418 -0.411 -0.662 
 (0.588) (0.0883) (0.145) (0.0698) (0.0337) (0.572) (4.179) 
Loans_Assets -0.118 0.0154 -0.0153 0.0122 0.00760 -0.125 0.174 
 (0.103) (0.0155) (0.0255) (0.0123) (0.00592) (0.100) (0.734) 
Wholesale -0.0327 -0.00595 0.0241 0.00116 -0.0181* -0.0146 2.111* 
 (0.169) (0.0254) (0.0418) (0.0201) (0.00971) (0.165) (1.202) 
Prop_revenue -0.281 -0.0653 -0.0475 0.0539 -0.0209 -0.260 -0.427 
 (0.308) (0.0463) (0.0762) (0.0366) (0.0177) (0.300) (2.193) 
Constant 117.6 19.39 244.3*** 44.36*** 0.828 116.8 758.7 
 (109.0) (16.37) (26.92) (12.94) (6.257) (106.2) (775.1) 
        
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 
R-squared 0.052 0.064 0.437 0.135 0.072 0.051 0.019 
Number of id 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A2 
Regression of alternative stability measures on HHI without macroeconomic variables 







Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl 
               
Boone 0.546 -29.53* -0.515 -17.25*** 1.034 -0.488 -2.673 -34.84 8.344 -9.486 3.331 -3.604* -31.24 675.3* 
 (86.91) (14.82) (7.374) (6.348) (5.713) (83.22) (2.347) (41.78) (6.278) (10.65) (5.218) (1.978) (41.03) (351.4) 
ln_assets -18.32 -26.06*** -5.171* -15.28*** -2.006 -16.31 -1.325 -9.099 0.104 -13.50*** -2.214* 0.0632 -9.162 -192.2** 
 (30.73) (5.240) (2.608) (2.245) (2.020) (29.43) (0.830) (9.750) (1.465) (2.486) (1.218) (0.462) (9.576) (82.00) 
Provs_Assets 0.203 -1.520*** -1.177*** -0.671*** -0.0322 0.235 1.221*** -0.188 -0.0265 1.264*** -0.435*** -0.0534 -0.134 -0.628 
 (2.168) (0.370) (0.184) (0.158) (0.143) (2.076) (0.0585) (0.805) (0.121) (0.205) (0.101) (0.0381) (0.791) (6.770) 
Loans_Assets -0.0580 -0.0156 -0.00713 -0.00723 -0.0130* -0.0450 -0.00391 -0.409 0.0657* 0.0936 0.0601* 0.0240** -0.433* 0.633 
 (0.104) (0.0177) (0.00879) (0.00757) (0.00681) (0.0992) (0.00280) (0.256) (0.0384) (0.0652) (0.0319) (0.0121) (0.251) (2.151) 
Wholesale 0.256 0.0388 0.0470 -0.00524 -0.00209 0.258 0.00576 -0.207 -0.0180 0.0684 -0.00414 -0.0166 -0.191 0.335 
 (0.475) (0.0809) (0.0403) (0.0347) (0.0312) (0.455) (0.0128) (0.241) (0.0362) (0.0614) (0.0301) (0.0114) (0.236) (2.024) 
Prop_revenue 0.521 -0.318** -0.0240 -0.170** -0.0142 0.535 -0.0269 -0.976** -0.0405 -0.0910 0.0840 -0.0455** -0.931** -3.640 
 (0.868) (0.148) (0.0736) (0.0634) (0.0571) (0.831) (0.0234) (0.414) (0.0622) (0.106) (0.0517) (0.0196) (0.407) (3.482) 
GDP_PT -8.147 38.77*** 5.995 21.45*** -1.396 -6.752 3.954* 0.585 3.056 7.316 -3.130 -2.359 2.943 1,590** 
 (77.84) (13.27) (6.604) (5.686) (5.117) (74.53) (2.102) (91.42) (13.74) (23.31) (11.42) (4.329) (89.79) (768.9) 
GDP_EA 2.941 -26.19*** -4.391 -14.43*** 0.829 2.112 -2.747* -8.475 -5.064 -12.36 4.896 3.807 -12.28 -2,406** 
 (52.39) (8.932) (4.445) (3.827) (3.444) (50.16) (1.415) (141.2) (21.21) (35.99) (17.63) (6.685) (138.6) (1,187) 
o.Unemployment - - - - - - -        
               
o.Inflation - - - - - - -        
               
o.IR_Short_EU - - - - - - -        
               
o.IR_Long_EU - - - - - - -        
               
o.Ratings_PTb - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
               
Unemployment        -7.972* -0.732 -0.616 -0.256 -0.0484 -7.923* -1.827 
        (4.364) (0.656) (1.113) (0.545) (0.207) (4.286) (36.70) 
Inflation        -4.049 0.592 2.566 -0.126 -0.590 -3.460 580.4** 
        (28.85) (4.335) (7.356) (3.603) (1.366) (28.33) (242.6) 
IR_Short_EU        -6.915 6.621 25.56 -13.13 -6.594 -0.321 3,830* 
        (256.5) (38.55) (65.41) (32.04) (12.15) (252.0) (2,158) 
IR_Long_EU        6.068 -1.748 -8.366 2.933 1.133 4.935 -920.2* 
        (65.48) (9.840) (16.70) (8.179) (3.101) (64.31) (550.8) 
Constant 275.0 381.4*** 84.96** 225.1*** 31.90 243.1 19.36 307.2 15.80 226.4*** 26.98 -3.246 310.4 6,067** 
 (442.1) (75.37) (37.51) (32.29) (29.06) (423.3) (11.94) (278.9) (41.90) (71.10) (34.83) (13.21) (273.9) (2,345) 
               
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 
R-squared 0.118 0.575 0.582 0.677 0.189 0.114 0.931 0.208 0.044 0.439 0.199 0.236 0.202 0.071 
Number of id 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Table A3 
Regression on Boone accounting for crisis (1-7) and post crisis (8-14) 








 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl 
               
HHI -284.1 1,007*** 442.7*** 495.2*** -25.76 -258.4 131.8** -949.5 227.4 -258.5 90.76 -98.21* -851.3 18,403* 
 (1,784) (319.3) (151.4) (142.1) (117.3) (1,708) (48.97) (1,138) (171.1) (290.3) (142.2) (53.91) (1,118) (9,575) 
ln_assets -18.38 -22.79*** -5.114** -13.37*** -2.120 -16.26 -1.028 -9.099 0.104 -13.50*** -2.214* 0.0632 -9.162 -192.2** 
 (28.82) (5.158) (2.445) (2.296) (1.895) (27.60) (0.791) (9.750) (1.465) (2.486) (1.218) (0.462) (9.576) (82.00) 
Provs_Assets 0.202 -1.514*** -1.177*** -0.667*** -0.0324 0.235 1.221*** -0.188 -0.0265 1.264*** -0.435*** -0.0534 -0.134 -0.628 
 (2.140) (0.383) (0.182) (0.171) (0.141) (2.049) (0.0587) (0.805) (0.121) (0.205) (0.101) (0.0381) (0.791) (6.770) 
Loans_Assets -0.0581 -0.0119 -0.00707 -0.00508 -0.0131* -0.0449 -0.00357 -0.409 0.0657* 0.0936 0.0601* 0.0240** -0.433* 0.633 
 (0.102) (0.0182) (0.00863) (0.00810) (0.00669) (0.0974) (0.00279) (0.256) (0.0384) (0.0652) (0.0319) (0.0121) (0.251) (2.151) 
Wholesale 0.256 0.0181 0.0466 -0.0173 -0.00136 0.258 0.00389 -0.207 -0.0180 0.0684 -0.00414 -0.0166 -0.191 0.335 
 (0.465) (0.0832) (0.0394) (0.0370) (0.0306) (0.445) (0.0128) (0.241) (0.0362) (0.0614) (0.0301) (0.0114) (0.236) (2.024) 
Prop_revenue 0.520 -0.275* -0.0232 -0.145** -0.0157 0.536 -0.0230 -0.976** -0.0405 -0.0910 0.0840 -0.0455** -0.931** -3.640 
 (0.848) (0.152) (0.0720) (0.0675) (0.0558) (0.812) (0.0233) (0.414) (0.0622) (0.106) (0.0517) (0.0196) (0.407) (3.482) 
GDP_PT -3.710 -0.520 -0.633** -0.193 -0.153 -3.557 -0.170** 106.3 -22.25* 36.09* -13.23 8.573** 97.69 -458.2 
 (2.904) (0.520) (0.246) (0.231) (0.191) (2.780) (0.0797) (83.00) (12.47) (21.16) (10.37) (3.930) (81.52) (698.1) 
GDP_EA - - - - - - -        
               
o.Unemployment - - - - - - -        
               
o.Inflation - - - - - - -        
               
o.IR_Short_EU - - - - - - -        
               
o.IR_Long_EU - - - - - - -        
               
o.Ratings_PTb - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
               
Unemployment        -171.2 33.91* -56.67* 20.45 -13.03** -158.2 748.9 
        (126.3) (18.99) (32.22) (15.78) (5.983) (124.1) (1,063) 
Inflation        -4.490 -1.566 0.332 -0.589 0.312 -4.801 -69.32 
        (7.423) (1.115) (1.893) (0.927) (0.352) (7.291) (62.43) 
IR_Short_EU        35.92 -8.981* 13.45 -3.947 3.545** 32.38 -194.3 
        (34.16) (5.134) (8.711) (4.267) (1.618) (33.55) (287.3) 
IR_Long_EU        269.1 -59.47* 100.7* -39.51 21.95** 247.1 -1,519 
        (232.1) (34.88) (59.18) (28.99) (10.99) (228.0) (1,952) 
Constant        -49.94 11.67 -23.62* 8.288 -4.660* -45.28 165.5 
        (54.30) (8.160) (13.85) (6.783) (2.572) (53.34) (456.7) 
 342.6 100.1 -19.80 82.67* 39.52 303.1 -15.64 653.8** -67.22 320.7*** -6.157 32.61** 621.2** -652.2 
Observations (536.0) (95.93) (45.48) (42.70) (35.25) (513.2) (14.71) (300.9) (45.21) (76.71) (37.58) (14.25) (295.5) (2,531) 
R-squared               
Number of id 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 
Table A4 
Regression on HHI accounting for crisis (1-7) and post crisis (8-14) 





Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl 
               
Lerner -35.68 -21.34** 4.425 -6.332 -1.073 -34.61 -0.494 -4.537 -0.00873 -1.300* -0.138 0.219 -4.756 -4.476 
 (59.53) (10.14) (5.025) (4.655) (3.929) (56.99) (1.639) (3.081) (0.466) (0.782) (0.387) (0.146) (3.023) (26.05) 
ln_assets -15.15 -20.86*** -5.515** -12.79*** -2.023 -13.13 -0.984 -8.971 0.0880 -13.26*** -2.250* 0.0238 -8.995 -189.0** 
 (29.55) (5.035) (2.494) (2.311) (1.950) (28.29) (0.814) (9.744) (1.475) (2.474) (1.223) (0.461) (9.564) (82.41) 
Provs_Assets 0.0476 -1.606*** -1.158*** -0.695*** -0.0371 0.0847 1.219*** -0.338 -0.0275 1.229*** -0.441*** -0.0475 -0.291 -0.649 
 (2.173) (0.370) (0.183) (0.170) (0.143) (2.081) (0.0598) (0.809) (0.122) (0.205) (0.102) (0.0382) (0.794) (6.843) 
Loans_Assets -0.0628 -0.0147 -0.00648 -0.00592 -0.0133* -0.0495 -0.00364 -0.270 0.0659 0.135* 0.0639* 0.0170 -0.287 0.799 
 (0.103) (0.0175) (0.00868) (0.00804) (0.00679) (0.0985) (0.00283) (0.273) (0.0413) (0.0693) (0.0342) (0.0129) (0.268) (2.307) 
Wholesale 0.322 0.0576 0.0384 -0.00561 0.000628 0.322 0.00480 -0.225 -0.0184 0.0685 -0.00567 -0.0165 -0.209 0.396 
 (0.481) (0.0820) (0.0406) (0.0376) (0.0318) (0.461) (0.0133) (0.241) (0.0364) (0.0611) (0.0302) (0.0114) (0.236) (2.034) 
Prop_revenue 0.345 -0.380** -0.00146 -0.176** -0.0210 0.366 -0.0254 -0.993** -0.0398 -0.105 0.0851 -0.0433** -0.950** -3.791 
 (0.904) (0.154) (0.0763) (0.0707) (0.0596) (0.865) (0.0249) (0.414) (0.0627) (0.105) (0.0520) (0.0196) (0.406) (3.502) 
GDP_PT -5.491 14.87*** 5.284** 7.118*** -0.447 -5.044 1.702** 71.22 -13.96 25.69 -9.808 5.195* 66.03 193.5 
 (23.69) (4.035) (1.999) (1.852) (1.563) (22.68) (0.652) (61.92) (9.373) (15.72) (7.770) (2.927) (60.77) (523.7) 
GDP_EA 1.127 -10.22*** -3.910*** -4.849*** 0.193 0.934 -1.240** -99.57 16.54 -35.21 13.19 -5.901 -93.67 -614.8 
 (16.83) (2.868) (1.421) (1.316) (1.111) (16.11) (0.464) (91.17) (13.80) (23.15) (11.44) (4.309) (89.48) (771.0) 
o.Unemployment - - - - - - -        
               
o.Inflation - - - - - - -        
               
o.IR_Short_EU - - - - - - -        
               
o.IR_Long_EU - - - - - - -        
               
o.Ratings_PTb - - - - - - -        
               
Unemployment        -7.281 -1.079 -0.171 -0.457 0.0800 -7.361 -24.65 
        (5.399) (0.817) (1.371) (0.677) (0.255) (5.299) (45.66) 
Inflation        8.721 -2.634 5.992 -1.428 0.845 7.876 317.9* 
        (20.75) (3.141) (5.268) (2.604) (0.981) (20.37) (175.5) 
IR_Short_EU        153.8 -30.20 65.43 -27.02 9.832 144.0 768.2 
        (179.1) (27.12) (45.48) (22.48) (8.467) (175.8) (1,515) 
IR_Long_EU        -21.94 4.145 -14.94 5.020 -1.488 -20.45 -421.6 
        (50.72) (7.677) (12.88) (6.364) (2.397) (49.77) (428.9) 
Constant        116.3 -28.70 32.80 -11.74 12.31* 104.0 -2,299* 
        (142.9) (21.64) (36.29) (17.94) (6.756) (140.3) (1,209) 
 249.1 320.7*** 87.50** 194.2*** 32.66 216.5 14.94 367.0 5.146 231.9*** 24.79 2.941 364.0 4,984** 
Observations (422.5) (71.98) (35.66) (33.03) (27.88) (404.5) (11.63) (243.2) (36.81) (61.74) (30.52) (11.49) (238.7) (2,057) 
R-squared               
Number of id 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Table A5 
Regression on Lerner accounting for crisis (1-7) and post crisis (8-14) 





 Big Banks 
 
High Capitalization High Liquidity 
VARIABLES roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k 
                
Boone 8.321** -13.97** 2.747 -0.608 -65.75*** -1.054 -10.01*** 0.934 -2.320 -52.76** -0.404 -10.50*** 0.327 -0.616 -42.20* 
 (3.790) (5.635) (3.204) (1.205) (22.13) (1.250) (3.088) (0.710) (1.400) (24.75) (1.133) (2.938) (0.612) (1.252) (24.69) 
ln_assets -2.277 -13.38*** -3.633* -0.689 -8.091 -1.065 -28.19*** -0.477 0.247 -27.75* 1.610*** -14.92*** -0.613** 0.938 -11.13 
 (2.499) (3.716) (2.113) (0.795) (14.59) (0.831) (2.052) (0.472) (0.930) (16.44) (0.525) (1.362) (0.284) (0.580) (11.45) 
Provs_Assets -0.183 0.117 -0.0540 -0.271** 1.847 -0.285*** -0.484** 0.0331 -0.0493 -0.134 -0.511*** -0.783* 0.0664 -0.131 0.220 
 (0.364) (0.541) (0.308) (0.116) (2.124) (0.0769) (0.190) (0.0436) (0.0861) (1.522) (0.155) (0.401) (0.0836) (0.171) (3.372) 
Loans_Assets 0.00790 -0.0135 0.00547 0.00701 -0.166 0.0308* 0.106** 0.0155 0.0399** -0.764** 0.0376 0.0803 -0.0472*** 0.0579** -0.0758 
 (0.0181) (0.0269) (0.0153) (0.00576) (0.106) (0.0166) (0.0409) (0.00941) (0.0186) (0.328) (0.0243) (0.0631) (0.0132) (0.0269) (0.530) 
Wholesale -0.00682 0.0191 -0.00148 -0.0147 -0.115 0.0145 -0.0540 0.000710 -0.00719 -0.337 0.0125 -0.0591* 0.0118* -0.00302 -0.566** 
 (0.0465) (0.0692) (0.0393) (0.0148) (0.272) (0.0152) (0.0375) (0.00862) (0.0170) (0.301) (0.0130) (0.0336) (0.00700) (0.0143) (0.282) 
Prop_revenue 0.104 -0.0219 0.211** -0.0183 -1.621** 0.0169 -0.0975 -0.0180 0.00509 -0.654 -0.0312 -0.0316 0.0383*** 0.00959 -0.721* 
 (0.120) (0.179) (0.102) (0.0383) (0.703) (0.0303) (0.0749) (0.0172) (0.0340) (0.600) (0.0190) (0.0492) (0.0103) (0.0210) (0.414) 
GDP_PT -1.199 0.0195 0.250 0.230 3.461 -0.529 -3.033* 0.152 -0.0293 -14.09 0.148 -2.665 0.472 -0.656 -19.28 
 (2.291) (3.406) (1.936) (0.728) (13.37) (0.733) (1.810) (0.416) (0.821) (14.50) (0.728) (1.888) (0.393) (0.804) (15.86) 
GDP_EA 0.201 0.680 -0.988 -0.447 -0.0673 0.344 3.461* -0.272 0.0760 15.89 0.0163 3.742* -0.614 0.670 17.95 
 (2.614) (3.886) (2.210) (0.831) (15.26) (0.817) (2.017) (0.464) (0.915) (16.17) (0.822) (2.132) (0.444) (0.908) (17.92) 
Unemployment -0.626 0.0140 -0.336 -0.232 -3.282 0.0818 -0.832 0.0414 -0.105 -8.541* 0.0944 -0.472 0.279** -0.388 -11.15** 
 (0.721) (1.072) (0.609) (0.229) (4.208) (0.243) (0.600) (0.138) (0.272) (4.807) (0.231) (0.599) (0.125) (0.255) (5.031) 
Inflation 0.120 -0.830 1.505 0.250 0.477 -0.196 -3.127* 0.265 -0.357 -12.58 -0.283 -3.048 0.591 -1.044 -17.93 
 (2.406) (3.577) (2.034) (0.765) (14.05) (0.746) (1.841) (0.423) (0.835) (14.76) (0.754) (1.956) (0.408) (0.833) (16.44) 
IR_Short_EU 1.140 -2.127 -0.182 -0.00794 -13.72** -0.0919 -1.961* 0.134 0.0676 -6.392 -0.222 -1.377 0.306 -0.173 -13.28* 
 (0.983) (1.461) (0.831) (0.312) (5.737) (0.401) (0.989) (0.227) (0.449) (7.929) (0.346) (0.898) (0.187) (0.383) (7.550) 
IR_Long_EU -2.601** 0.828 -1.043 -0.443 7.014 0.0128 -0.717 -0.204 0.130 5.619 0.328 -0.839 -0.356 0.163 2.651 
 (1.226) (1.823) (1.037) (0.390) (7.160) (0.450) (1.112) (0.256) (0.504) (8.911) (0.413) (1.072) (0.223) (0.457) (9.009) 
Ratings_PTb -7.660 9.556 -4.827 -0.630 30.89 -0.667 3.460 -1.025 1.885 18.94 0.909 7.918 -1.489 1.367 6.062 
 (8.843) (13.15) (7.476) (2.811) (51.63) (3.254) (8.035) (1.847) (3.643) (64.40) (2.961) (7.683) (1.601) (3.273) (64.56) 
Constant 52.58 214.2*** 62.32* 17.85 198.6 13.06 423.2*** 9.089 -2.985 552.4** -22.85*** 230.0*** 6.565 -7.828 366.8** 
 (40.67) (60.48) (34.39) (12.93) (237.5) (12.78) (31.55) (7.253) (14.31) (252.9) (8.251) (21.41) (4.462) (9.119) (179.9) 
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 144 144 144 144 144 145 145 145 145 145 
R-squared 0.066 0.229 0.125 0.229 0.221 0.230 0.696 0.101 0.120 0.255 0.335 0.636 0.463 0.192 0.196 
Number of id 20 20 20 20 20 26 26 26 26 26 19 19 19 19 19 
Table A6 
Regression on Boone accounting for size, capitalization and liquidity 





Regression on HHI accounting for size, capitalization and liquidity 
 
 Big Banks 
 
High Capitalization High Liquidity 
VARIABLES roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k 
                
HHI 185.1 -252.9 54.52 -53.63 -1,320 -87.43* -105.5 20.25 -47.34 -387.1 -65.82 -95.07 4.918 -8.057 58.42 
 (162.5) (243.0) (135.9) (50.81) (960.6) (48.44) (126.6) (27.99) (55.42) (990.4) (49.32) (135.7) (26.89) (54.96) (1,097) 
ln_assets -2.269 -13.45*** -3.624* -0.649 -8.297 -1.088 -28.57*** -0.444 0.165 -29.76* 1.578*** -14.90*** -0.612** 0.937 -10.84 
 (2.536) (3.793) (2.121) (0.793) (14.99) (0.820) (2.141) (0.474) (0.938) (16.76) (0.522) (1.435) (0.285) (0.581) (11.61) 
Provs_Assets -0.111 -0.00336 -0.0303 -0.276** 1.280 -0.301*** -0.560*** 0.0413 -0.0695 -0.521 -0.508*** -0.775* 0.0661 -0.130 0.233 
 (0.367) (0.549) (0.307) (0.115) (2.170) (0.0757) (0.198) (0.0437) (0.0866) (1.547) (0.154) (0.422) (0.0837) (0.171) (3.416) 
Loans_Assets 0.00847 -0.0146 0.00569 0.00713 -0.171 0.0319* 0.109** 0.0151 0.0408** -0.751** 0.0391 0.0842 -0.0474*** 0.0581** -0.0703 
 (0.0184) (0.0274) (0.0153) (0.00574) (0.109) (0.0164) (0.0428) (0.00946) (0.0187) (0.335) (0.0242) (0.0665) (0.0132) (0.0269) (0.538) 
Wholesale -0.00869 0.0222 -0.00210 -0.0146 -0.100 0.0158 -0.0479 6.46e-05 -0.00560 -0.307 0.0117 -0.0622* 0.0119* -0.00322 -0.574** 
 (0.0471) (0.0705) (0.0394) (0.0147) (0.279) (0.0150) (0.0392) (0.00866) (0.0172) (0.307) (0.0129) (0.0354) (0.00701) (0.0143) (0.286) 
Prop_revenue 0.0708 0.0391 0.199* -0.0189 -1.344* 0.0176 -0.117 -0.0165 0.00136 -0.764 -0.0310 -0.0284 0.0382*** 0.00978 -0.708* 
 (0.121) (0.180) (0.101) (0.0377) (0.713) (0.0299) (0.0781) (0.0173) (0.0342) (0.611) (0.0188) (0.0518) (0.0103) (0.0210) (0.419) 
GDP_PT -3.176 2.604 -0.319 0.883 17.26 0.625 -2.025 -0.0849 0.519 -11.09 0.960 -2.019 0.427 -0.587 -22.27 
 (3.101) (4.637) (2.593) (0.970) (18.33) (0.982) (2.564) (0.567) (1.123) (20.07) (0.953) (2.622) (0.520) (1.062) (21.20) 
GDP_EA 2.943 -3.205 -0.165 -1.145 -19.96 -0.926 1.530 0.0537 -0.691 8.074 -0.831 2.135 -0.540 0.545 17.06 
 (3.321) (4.966) (2.777) (1.038) (19.63) (1.052) (2.749) (0.608) (1.204) (21.51) (1.026) (2.823) (0.559) (1.143) (22.82) 
Unemployment -1.097 0.499 -0.456 0.0142 -0.315 0.505 -0.948 -0.00709 -0.00147 -10.11 0.414 -0.748 0.277 -0.391 -14.60* 
 (1.103) (1.650) (0.922) (0.345) (6.522) (0.355) (0.927) (0.205) (0.406) (7.257) (0.338) (0.930) (0.184) (0.377) (7.519) 
Inflation -2.525 3.017 0.700 0.853 19.91 0.922 -1.077 -0.0494 0.389 -3.773 0.440 -1.267 0.514 -0.913 -15.42 
 (2.930) (4.382) (2.450) (0.916) (17.32) (0.928) (2.424) (0.536) (1.061) (18.97) (0.908) (2.497) (0.495) (1.011) (20.19) 
IR_Short_EU 1.594 -2.624 -0.0623 -0.224 -16.65** -0.460 -2.497** 0.226 -0.150 -8.525 -0.484 -1.536 0.319 -0.193 -12.10 
 (1.227) (1.835) (1.026) (0.384) (7.255) (0.442) (1.155) (0.256) (0.506) (9.041) (0.399) (1.096) (0.217) (0.444) (8.864) 
IR_Long_EU -5.229 4.028 -1.772 0.588 24.78 1.642 0.356 -0.511 0.834 7.928 1.614 -0.293 -0.412 0.245 -4.119 
 (3.576) (5.348) (2.990) (1.118) (21.14) (1.052) (2.750) (0.608) (1.204) (21.52) (1.074) (2.954) (0.586) (1.197) (23.89) 
Ratings_PTb -6.341 5.519 -4.184 0.537 15.96 0.991 -2.293 -0.797 1.231 -16.37 2.613 2.208 -1.371 1.109 -30.54 
 (9.779) (14.62) (8.176) (3.058) (57.81) (3.347) (8.743) (1.934) (3.828) (68.42) (3.180) (8.748) (1.734) (3.544) (70.73) 
Constant 26.04 255.2*** 53.98 22.30* 399.3 21.52* 452.4*** 5.626 5.410 694.8*** -16.64* 254.3*** 5.640 -6.190 427.3** 
 (41.89) (62.64) (35.02) (13.10) (247.6) (12.80) (33.43) (7.393) (14.64) (261.6) (9.033) (24.85) (4.925) (10.07) (200.9) 
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 144 144 144 144 144 145 145 145 145 145 
R-squared 0.041 0.200 0.121 0.234 0.180 0.249 0.667 0.091 0.104 0.224 0.344 0.596 0.462 0.191 0.176 
Number of id 20 20 20 20 20 26 26 26 26 26 19 19 19 19 19 





 Big Banks 
 
High Capitalization High Liquidity 
VARIABLES roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k 
                
Boone -7.259** 0.116 -0.422 -0.0641 0.148 -0.880** -0.499 1.145*** 0.670 -28.17*** -0.00914 -0.955** 0.194** 0.156 -6.934* 
 (3.205) (0.546) (0.815) (0.455) (0.170) (0.423) (1.112) (0.220) (0.486) (8.299) (0.172) (0.455) (0.0912) (0.189) (3.739) 
ln_assets -19.52 -1.937 -14.24*** -3.650* -0.515 -0.670 -28.13*** -1.123** -0.264 -14.48 1.578*** -14.35*** -0.676** 0.845 -10.01 
 (15.47) (2.636) (3.935) (2.194) (0.821) (0.849) (2.233) (0.441) (0.977) (16.66) (0.531) (1.407) (0.282) (0.584) (11.55) 
Provs_Assets 0.250 -0.0990 -0.0476 -0.0369 -0.261** -0.318*** -0.548*** 0.0647 -0.0511 -1.224 -0.526*** -0.764* 0.0795 -0.138 -0.741 
 (2.191) (0.373) (0.557) (0.311) (0.116) (0.0757) (0.199) (0.0393) (0.0871) (1.486) (0.158) (0.418) (0.0837) (0.174) (3.431) 
Loans_Assets -0.140 0.00874 -0.0139 0.00618 0.00629 0.0453** 0.115** -0.00258 0.0299 -0.305 0.0400 0.109 -0.0551*** 0.0542* 0.281 
 (0.109) (0.0186) (0.0277) (0.0155) (0.00579) (0.0176) (0.0462) (0.00912) (0.0202) (0.345) (0.0258) (0.0683) (0.0137) (0.0284) (0.561) 
Wholesale -0.0865 -0.00898 0.0237 -0.00178 -0.0152 0.0175 -0.0417 -0.00595 -0.0101 -0.197 0.0120 -0.0552 0.0111 -0.00431 -0.563** 
 (0.278) (0.0474) (0.0708) (0.0395) (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.0396) (0.00782) (0.0173) (0.295) (0.0130) (0.0345) (0.00691) (0.0143) (0.283) 
Prop_revenue -1.196* 0.0555 0.0622 0.195* -0.0160 0.0301 -0.124 -0.0298* -0.00753 -0.353 -0.0305 -0.0285 0.0376*** 0.00999 -0.667 
 (0.708) (0.121) (0.180) (0.100) (0.0376) (0.0303) (0.0796) (0.0157) (0.0348) (0.594) (0.0191) (0.0505) (0.0101) (0.0210) (0.415) 
GDP_PT -2.372 -0.776 -0.788 0.346 0.265 -0.594 -3.133 0.0259 -0.259 -14.70 0.0761 -3.362* 0.570 -0.683 -26.06 
 (13.72) (2.337) (3.490) (1.946) (0.728) (0.722) (1.898) (0.375) (0.830) (14.17) (0.737) (1.951) (0.391) (0.810) (16.02) 
GDP_EA -0.551 0.592 0.135 -0.809 -0.552 0.352 2.687 -0.111 0.0701 12.97 0.0528 3.535 -0.696 0.631 21.35 
 (15.65) (2.666) (3.981) (2.220) (0.831) (0.803) (2.112) (0.417) (0.924) (15.76) (0.833) (2.206) (0.442) (0.916) (18.12) 
Unemployment -8.746** -0.0990 -0.907 -0.178 -0.245 0.0524 -1.370** -0.0355 -0.369 -9.837** 0.0430 -1.279** 0.332*** -0.437* -15.99*** 
 (4.113) (0.701) (1.046) (0.583) (0.218) (0.228) (0.601) (0.119) (0.263) (4.483) (0.220) (0.583) (0.117) (0.242) (4.789) 
Inflation 3.968 -0.587 0.270 1.233 0.360 -0.253 -2.116 0.217 -0.179 -11.00 -0.291 -2.438 0.639 -0.983 -18.62 
 (14.29) (2.434) (3.633) (2.026) (0.758) (0.728) (1.913) (0.378) (0.837) (14.28) (0.758) (2.007) (0.402) (0.834) (16.48) 
IR_Short_EU -10.54* 0.749 -1.468 -0.310 0.0188 -0.00497 -1.943* -0.0209 -0.0589 -3.366 -0.222 -0.996 0.281 -0.188 -12.07 
 (5.777) (0.984) (1.469) (0.819) (0.307) (0.397) (1.043) (0.206) (0.456) (7.787) (0.347) (0.919) (0.184) (0.382) (7.549) 
IR_Long_EU -2.482 -1.367 -1.215 -0.623 -0.553 -0.148 -1.682 -0.0868 -0.101 -0.901 0.266 -2.270** -0.294 0.0857 -3.872 
 (6.506) (1.108) (1.654) (0.923) (0.345) (0.424) (1.115) (0.220) (0.487) (8.318) (0.387) (1.025) (0.205) (0.426) (8.418) 
Ratings_PTb -21.76 -0.586 -2.160 -2.421 -1.256 -0.611 -5.179 -1.309 -0.796 1.743 0.648 -0.389 -1.362 0.826 -21.34 
 (49.19) (8.379) (12.51) (6.976) (2.611) (3.029) (7.966) (1.573) (3.484) (59.45) (2.825) (7.482) (1.500) (3.108) (61.44) 
Constant 489.3* 35.17 248.3*** 58.74* 15.81 7.931 435.8*** 19.39*** 9.738 398.2 -21.52*** 238.4*** 6.712 -5.362 435.7** 
 (249.1) (42.43) (63.35) (35.33) (13.22) (13.02) (34.24) (6.761) (14.97) (255.5) (8.189) (21.69) (4.346) (9.008) (178.1) 
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 143 143 143 143 143 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.207 0.031 0.195 0.120 0.232 0.262 0.661 0.268 0.117 0.302 0.336 0.604 0.480 0.202 0.202 
Number of id 20 20 20 20 20 26 26 26 26 26 19 19 19 19 19 
Table A8 
Regression on Lerner accounting for size, capitalization and liquidity 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl z_score roa k sd3_roa risk_roa risk_k npl 
               
Lerner -35.68 -21.34** 4.425 -6.332 -1.073 -34.61 -0.494 -4.537 -0.00873 -1.300* -0.138 0.219 -4.756 -4.476 
 (59.53) (10.14) (5.025) (4.655) (3.929) (56.99) (1.639) (3.081) (0.466) (0.782) (0.387) (0.146) (3.023) (26.05) 
ln_assets -15.15 -20.86*** -5.515** -12.79*** -2.023 -13.13 -0.984 -8.971 0.0880 -13.26*** -2.250* 0.0238 -8.995 -189.0** 
 (29.55) (5.035) (2.494) (2.311) (1.950) (28.29) (0.814) (9.744) (1.475) (2.474) (1.223) (0.461) (9.564) (82.41) 
Provs_Assets 0.0476 -1.606*** -1.158*** -0.695*** -0.0371 0.0847 1.219*** -0.338 -0.0275 1.229*** -0.441*** -0.0475 -0.291 -0.649 
 (2.173) (0.370) (0.183) (0. 70) (0.143) (2.081) .0598) .809) (0.122) (0.205  (0.102) (0.0382) (0.794) (6.843) 
Loans_Assets -0.0628 -0.0147 -0.00648 -0.00592 -0.0133* -0.0495 -0.00364 -0.270 0.0659 0.135* 0.0639* 0.0170 -0.287 0.799 
 (0.103) (0.0175) (0.00868) (0.00804) (0.00679) (0.0985) (0.00283) (0.273) (0.0413) (0.0693) (0.0342) (0.0129) (0.268) (2.307) 
Wholesale 0.322 0.0576 0.0384 -0.00561 0.000628 0.322 0.00480 -0.225 -0.0184 0.0685 -0.00567 -0.0165 -0.209 0.396 
 (0.481) (0.0820) (0.0406) (0.0376) (0.0318) (0.461) (0.0133) (0.241) (0.0364) (0.0611) (0.0302) (0.0114) (0.236) (2.034) 
Prop_revenue 0.345 -0.380** -0.00146 - .176** -0.0210 0.366 -0. 254 - 993** -0.0398 - .105 0. 851 -0.0433** -0.950** -3.791 
 (0.904) (0.154) (0.0763) (0.0707) (0.0596) (0.865) (0.0249) (0.414) (0.0627) (0.105) (0.0520) (0.0196) (0.406) (3.502) 
GDP_PT -5.491 14.87*** 5.284** 7.118*** -0.447 -5.044 1.702** 71.22 -13.96 25.69 -9.808 5.195* 66.03 193.5 
 (23.69) (4.035) (1.999) (1.852) (1.563) (22.68) (0.652) (61.92) (9.373) (15.72) (7.770) (2.927) (60.77) (523.7) 
GDP_EA 1.127 -10.22*** -3.910*** -4.849*** 0.193 0.934 -1.240** -99.57 16.54 -35.21 13.19 -5.901 -93.67 -614.8 
 (16.83) (2.868) (1.421) (1.316) (1.111) (16.11) (0.464) (91.17) (13.80) (23.15) (11.44) (4.309) (89.48) (771.0) 
o.Unemployment - - - - - - -        
               
o.Inflation - - - - - - -        
               
o.IR_Short_EU - - - - - - -        
               
o.IR_Long_EU - - - - - - -        
               
o.Ratings_PTb - - - - - - -        
               
Unemployment        -7.281 -1.079 -0.171 -0.457 0.0800 -7.361 -24.65 
        (5. 9 ) (0.817) (1.371) (0.6 7) ( .255) (5.299) (45.66) 
Inflation        8.721 -2.634 5.992 -1.428 0.845 7.876 317.9* 
        (20.75) (3.141) (5.268) (2.604) (0.981) (20.37) (175.5) 
IR_Short_EU        153.8 -30.20 65.43 -27.02 9.832 144.0 768.2 
        (179.1) (27.12) (45.48) (22.48) (8.467) (175.8) (1,515) 
IR_Long_EU        -21.94 4.145 -14.94 5.020 -1.488 -20.45 -421.6 
        (50.72) (7.677) (12.88) (6.364) (2.397) (49.77) (428.9) 
Constant        116.3 -28.70 32.80 -11.74 12.31* 104.0 -2,299* 
        (142.9) (21.64) (36.29) (17.94) (6.756) (140.3) (1,209) 
 249.1 320.7*** 87.50** 194.2*** 32.66 216.5 14.94 367.0 5.146 231.9*** 24.79 2.941 364.0 4,984** 
Observations (422.5) (71.98) (35.66) (33.03) (27.88) (404.5) (11.63) (243.2) (36.81) (61.74) (30.52) (11.49) (238.7) (2,057) 
R-squared               
Number of id 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 
